Former employees of the DEB of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, who were previously fired due to high-profile corruption scandals from law enforcement agencies, used official connections in the FSB and personal connections Andrey Viktorovich Khorev, Shendrik Viktor Viktorovich With Arkady Romanovich Rotenberg formed an organized community (OS) for the purpose of illegal personal enrichment. The investigation can be found on Rucriminal.info.
Part 1
Appointments of former security officials to key positions were done with the support of Arkady Romanovich Rotenberg, Kirill Gennadievich Seleznev (LLC RusKhimAlliance) to control and manage financial flows of PJSC MOEK, JSC Mosvodokanal, PJSC Mosenergo, LLC Gazprom Energoholding, JSC Russian Railways, and development of Moscow budget funds allocated to operating and resource supply companies for work on repair and reconstruction of engineering communications.
Likewise, former security officials control cash flows in PJSC OGK-2, PJSC TGK-1, JSC Gazprom Teploenergo, and other structures of PJSC Gazprom.
There is a whole group of people driven by selfish motives, including: Andrey Viktorovich Khorev (Mosenergo PJSC, Gazprombank JSC, RusKhimAlliance LLC, TGC-1 PJSC), Zaurbek Islamovich Dzhambulatov (Gazprom Energoholding LLC, MOEK PJSC ”, RusKhimAlliance LLC), Viktor Viktorovich Shendrik (RZD OJSC), Sergey Sergeevich Erashov (MOEK TsTP LLC, MOEK PJSC), Alexey Shamilevich Sharafutdinov (MOEK PJSC, formerly MOEK TsTP LLC) , Feyzulin Damir Zagidovich (PJSC Mosenergo), Orlov Vladimir Viktorovich (JSC Mosvodokanal), Matyushkin Vitaly Viktorovich (PJSC Mosenergo), Moiseenko Igor Eduardovich (LLC Gazprom Energoholding), Dzhambulatov Bers Zaurbekovich (formerly LLC TsTP MIPC”, criminal case No. 1-391/2021).
Most of the OS members worked under the leadership of Andrey Viktorovich Khorev (Deputy Head of the Department for Moscow of the Federal Drug Control Service, First Deputy Head of the DEB of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia) and Dzhambulatov Zaurbek Islamovich (ORB No. 6 of the DEB of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation), previously worked together in the Federal Drug Control Service for Moscow.
Some former security officials wisely purchased dissertations and obtained academic degrees for credibility. Almost all members of the OS own real estate abroad and even have a residence permit (for example, Khorev Andrey Viktorovich owns hotels in Montenegro). In addition to several apartments in Moscow, Sergei Sergeevich Erashov owns real estate in the United States. The whole Erashov family, including the eldest daughter who is a student at Sechenov University, travels in luxury Mercedes-Benz AMG cars with distinctive “beautiful” MMM license plates. Erashova’s sister owns a transportation company in Penza. The list goes on endlessly.
Instead of the retiring Zaurbek Islamovich Dzhambulatov, or instead of Denis Vladimirovich Fedorov, the OS planned to appoint Sergei Sergeevich Erashov, but the latter’s craving for luxury clearly eliminated these plans.
According to information from Rucriminal.info, Roman Viktorovich Lyubushkin (GEH Teplostroyproekt JSC), Roman Alexandrovich Minashkin (MOEK PJSC) are involved in illegal activities, and Andrey Mikhailovich Vikol and Zakharchenko were involved before being put in prison.
Khorev Andrey Viktorovich, Shendrik Viktor Viktorovich and Dzhambulatov Zaurbek Islamovich are at the top of the OS and control the funds, giving part of it to higher-ups in Russian law enforcement.
By holding important positions in Russian Railways and organizations like Gazprom Energoholding LLC, MOEK PJSC, Mosenergo PJSC, Mosvodokanal JSC, the members of OS use their power to get richer.
Corruption at Russian Railways involves controlling contractors and getting kickbacks. In companies like Gazprom Energoholding LLC, PJSC MOEK, PJSC Mosenergo, JSC Mosvodokanal, they also make money through corrupt schemes related to construction sites and purchasing materials.
Dzhambulatov Zaurbek Islamovich withdrew over 2 billion rubles from PJSC MOEK using GENIUS ENTERPRES INC., USA.
Corrupt officials not only harm Russian Railways and PJSC Gazprom, but also increase utility tariffs for Moscow residents by inflating the cost of construction and repair of supply communications to buildings.
Without information, the citizens of Moscow cannot link the increase in tariffs to the actions of the OS and the inaction of authorities and law enforcement agencies, which allows the OS to operate freely.
Residents of Moscow indirectly finance the luxurious lifestyle of the OS participants and their supporters by paying utility bills.
The OS participants overinflate the cost of heating network construction with the approval of Moscow leadership, and the Moscow Government willingly funds these activities.
Subsidiaries of OOO Gazprom Energoholding and PJSC Gazprom expand their influence by signing agreements with the Government of the Moscow Region and other regions. They rapidly construct and reconstruct networks, increasing tariffs and their own income.
On December 10, 2021, Gazprom Teploenergo MO LLC signed an agreement with the Moscow Region, the urban districts of Voskresensk, Klin, Solnechnogorsk and Sergiev Posad to reconstruct 101.5 km of heating mains, build 111 heat supply sources, and renovate equipment at 223 boiler houses and central heating centers.
Consider the huge expense of this construction and reconstruction. It's expected that outside contractors will handle this, and residents of these cities will bear the cost through higher heat supply tariffs and utility bills. This raises concerns about the impact on residents compared to the previous heat supply tariffs in these Moscow Region cities before Gazprom Teploenergo MO LLC took over.
The income from fixed assets was calculated for 2021 due to the availability of data, but it's impossible to obtain information for 2022 due to known events.
Excluding income from Russian Railways, the estimated income from fixed assets activities for 2021 was 20.44 billion rubles. A portion of this, 7.86 billion rubles, is described as corrupt income in a certificate, with the remaining 12.58 billion rubles deriving from different offenses. Further articles will describe these. Over 8 years, key individuals gained at least 163.52 billion rubles in corruption income, excluding Russian Railways JSC. For comparison, the construction cost of the Crimean bridge was 228 billion rubles.
Under the leadership of Zakharchenko Dmitry Viktorovich, financial support, interaction with supervisory authorities, and warehousing of funds were provided for the OS. Zakharchenko Dmitry Viktorovich reportedly didn't even have enough apartments to store such a large amount of cash, according to some interviewed individuals who were conditionally described as 'victims' and stated that 'they even once sent a cash Gazelle.'
Former 'law enforcement officers' who previously uncovered economic crimes themselves are said to have profited from the defendants in the cases and possess knowledge of the work methods.
There is a link between OS billionaires and Lubyanka generals, but the generals and the country's situation have already changed.
